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an accused who is represented by counsel should not be evaluated
subjectively after the fact, but must be scrutinized as of the time
of its inception for potential exacerbation of the imbalance be-
tween the suspect and the state.2 5
William J. Birney
Transfer of custody is dependent upon best interests of the child,
not upon whether particular changed circumstances can be de-
nominated extraordinary
Awards of child custody typically are based upon "the best in-
terests of the child. 262 This standard has been applied in initial
after he had requested legal assistance. Id. at 479, 430 N.E.2d at 1267, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 214.
285 Protection of an accused's right to counsel does not put him in an advantageous
position, People v. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d 167, 173, 397 N.E.2d 709, 713, 422 N.Y.S.2d 18, 22
(1979), but merely serves to minimize the disadvantages under which an accused, facing the
law enforcement power of the state, labors, People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d 154, 160-61, 385
N.E.2d 612, 615, 412 N.Y.S.2d 874, 877 (1978).
"I DRL § 240(1), commentary at 164 (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982); see, e.g., Lincoln v.
Lincoln, 24 N.Y.2d 270, 272, 247 N.E.2d 659, 661, 299 N.Y.S.2d 842, 843 (1969); Barkley v.
Barkley, 60 App. Div. 2d 954, 955, 402 N.Y.S.2d 228, 229 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 45 N.Y.2d 936,
383 N.E.2d 1154, 411 N.Y.S.2d 561 (1978); Lucey v. Lucey, 60 'App. Div. 2d 757, 757, 400
N.Y.S.2d 610, 610 (4th Dep't 1977). Although the standard of "best interests of the child" is
presently codified in the DRL, the rule existed long before the original enactment of the
statute. See DRL § 240(1), commentary at 164 (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). The rule ap-
pears to have originated in the case of Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E. 624 (1925),
see generally Brosky & Alford, Sharpening Solomon's Sword: Current Considerations in
Child Custody Cases, 81 DICK. L. REV. 683, 685 (1977), wherein Judge Cardozo stated that
the court must act "to do what is best for the interests of the child .... [and to] put [itself]
in the position of a 'wise, affectionate and careful parent.'" Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. at
433, 148 N.E. at 626 (citation omitted). Application of this standard entails the examination
of numerous criteria. See Schiller, Child Custody: Evolution of Current Criteria, 26 DE
PAUL L. REv. 241, 245 (1977). Among these criteria are parental competence, the age, sex
and preference of the child, religious training, and reluctance to separate siblings. Brosky &
Alford, supra, at 686-91. Various devices are used to aid the court in its determination of
what is in the best interests of the child. These devices include interviews of the children
outside the presence of the parties, see, e.g., Todaro v. Todaro, 76 App. Div. 2d 816, 816, 429
N.Y.S.2d 670, 672 (1st Dep't 1980), and the use of court-appointed psychiatrists to examine
the children and parents, see, e.g., Salk v. Salk, 89 Misc. 2d 883, 891, 393 N.Y.S.2d 841, 846
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1975), aff'd, 53 App. Div. 2d 558, 385 N.Y.S.2d 1015 (1st Dep't 1976).
For a discussion of an approach that proposes the incorporation of social services into the
determination of a child's best interest, see Kirschner, Child Custody Determinations-A
Better Way!, 17 J. FAM. L. 275 (1978-1979).
Interestingly, the early common law perceived the father as having a natural right in
the custody of his children, while the mother was entitled merely to reverence and respect.
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custodial proceedings as well as proceedings to change or modify
existing custodial decrees.28 Doubts have surfaced, however, as to
whether an "extraordinary change in circumstances" must be es-
tablished in order to obtain a modification of the original grant of
custody.288 Recently, in Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer8 s the
Weitzman & Dixon, Child Custody Awards: Legal Standards and Empirical Patterns for
Child Custody, Support, and Visitation After Divorce, 12 U.C.D. L. REv. 473, 478 (1979).
Hence, the father would obtain custody unless it could be shown that he was unfit. Mosko-
witz, Divorce-Custody Dispositions: The Child's Wishes in Perspective, 18 SANTA CLARA L.
REv. 427, 428 (1978). The presumption in favor of the father eventually evolved into the
presumption that a child of "tender years" should remain in the care of the mother. Id. at
429. The maternal presumption, however, is currently being replaced by an approach that
favors neither parent on the basis of sex. Brosky & Alford, supra, at 685. But see Comment,
The Rights of Children: A Trust Model, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 669, 744 (1978) (courts pay
"lip service to the 'best interests of the child' while they continue to protect the mother's
expectations with regard to the child").
267 See Corradino v. Corradino, 64 App. Div. 2d 320, 322, 410 N.Y.S.2d 174, 175 (3d
Dep't 1978), aff'd, 48 N.Y.2d 894, 400 N.E.2d 1338, 424 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1979); DRL § 240(1)
(McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). Compare Bistany v. Bistany, 66 App. Div. 2d 1026, 1026, 411
N.Y.S.2d 728, 729 (4th Dep't 1978) (the paramount concern in original custodial dispute
must be the best interests of the children) with La Veglia v. La Veglia, 54 App. Div. 2d 727,
727, 387 N.Y.S.2d 683, 684 (2d Dep't 1976) (the paramount concern on a motion to modify a
custodial order is the best interests of the child) and Odette R. v. Douglas R., 91 Misc. 2d
792, 795, 399 N.Y.S.2d 93, 95 (Family Ct. N.Y. County 1977) (in a subsequent custody pro-
ceeding, the court must decide what is in the best interests of the children). Section 240 of
the DRL, which codifies the best interests standard, applies to "any action or proceeding
... to obtain... the custody of or right to visitation with any child of a marriage." DRL §
240(1) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982).
The court derives its power to act in a child's best interests from the concept of parens
patriae. Brosky & Alford, supra note 266, at 684-85. Literally, this phrase means "parent of
the country." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979). As originally used by the early
chancery courts of England, however, it stood for the courts' function "to assume a guardi-
anship role over persons under a disability," Brosky & Alford, supra note 266, at 684; see A.
LINDEY, SEPARA7TON AGREEMESNTS AND ANTE-NupTIAL CONTRACTS § 14, at 14-65 (1982). For a
discussion of the common-law evolution of parens patriae, see Custer, The Origins of the
Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27 EMORY L.J. 195 (1978). In addition to adjudications incident
to divorce or petitions to modify custody, courts have been called upon to exercise their
powers as parens patriae in custodial habeas corpus proceedings. See, e.g., Finlay v. Finlay,
240 N.Y. 429, 431-32, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (1925). Indeed, section 70 of the DRL, which gov-
erns this type of habeas proceeding, provides that custody shall be determined "solely [by]
... the best interests of the child, and what will best promote its welfare and happiness."
DRL § 70 (1977).
268 See note 276 and accompanying text infra. Although it is clear that some change in
circumstances must occur between the original grant of custody and the subsequent modifi-
cation or transfer, whether the change warrants a transfer of custody is discretionary in the
trial judge. See Ross v. Ross, 77 App. Div. 2d 716, 716, 430 N.Y.S.2d 712, 713 (3d Dep't
1980). Thus, while some courts have required a "material change in circumstances," see, e.g.,
Ebert v. Ebert, 38 N.Y.2d 700, 703-04, 346 N.E.2d 240, 242, 382 N.Y.S.2d 472, 474 (1976);
DiBello v. DiBello, 78 App. Div. 2d 547, 547, 432 N.Y.S.2d 32, 32-33 (2d Dep't 1980), others
have required an "extraordinary" change, see, e.g., DeFrancesco v. MacNary, 74 App. Div.
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Court of Appeals held that the proper standard to be applied in a
proceeding to change or modify custody "remains the best inter-
ests of the child when all of the applicable factors are considered,
not whether there exists one or more circumstances that can be
denominated extraordinary. 2 °7 0
In Friederwitzer, the parents of two young girls entered a sep-
aration agreement that provided for joint custody of the chil-
dren.17 1 This agreement survived the couple's subsequent divorce,
2d 966, 967, 425 N.Y.S.2d 885, 886 (3d Dep't 1980). Additionally, some tribunals have stated
that a "substantial" change is necessary for a change or modification of custody, see, e.g.,
Arcarese v. Monachino, 58 App. Div. 2d 1030, 1031, 397 N.Y.S.2d 284, 285 (4th Dep't 1977);
Rusin v. Rusin, 103 Misc. 2d 534, 536, 426 N.Y.S.2d 701, 703 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1980),
while others have opined that a transfer of custody is warranted merely by a "change in
circumstances" that is detrimental to the children, see, e.g., Braiman v. Braiman, 61 App.
Div. 2d 995, 998, 402 N.Y.S.2d 643, 647 (2d Dep't), rev'd, 44 N.Y.2d 584, 378 N.E.2d 1019,
407 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1978); Hechemy v. Hechemy, 82 Misc. 2d 79, 81, 368 N.Y.S.2d 709, 711
(Sup. Ct. Albany County 1975). Furthermore, there have been cases in which transfers of
custody were denied because of a failure to show that the custodial parent was "unfit or less
fit" than the noncustodial parent. See, e.g., Cmaylo v. Cmaylo, 76 App. Div. 2d 898, 899, 429
N.Y.S.2d 44, 46 (2d Dep't 1980); Opferbeck v. Opferbeck, 57 App. Div. 2d 1074, 1074, 395
N.Y.S.2d 831, 832 (4th Dep't 1977); Nierenberg v. Nierenberg, 43 App. Div. 2d 717, 718, 350
N.Y.S.2d 437, 438 (2d Dep't 1973), aff'd, 36 N.Y.2d 850, 331 N.E.2d 693, 370 N.Y.S.2d 915
(1975); Rodolpho "CC" v. Susan "CC," 37 App. Div. 2d 657, 657, 322 N.Y.S.2d 388, 389 (3d
Dep't 1971); Wout v. Wout, 32 App. Div. 2d 709, 710, 300 N.Y.S.2d 24, 26 (3d Dep't 1969).
Finally, it even appears that some courts have rendered de novo determinations of a child's
best interests. See, e.g., Porges v. Porges, 63 App. Div. 2d 712, 712-13, 405 N.Y.S.2d 115, 116
(2d Dep't 1978); Margaret B. X. Jeffrey B., 106 Misc. 2d 608, 610, 435 N.Y.S.2d 499, 501
(Family Ct. Warren County 1980).
The landmark case of Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 356 N.E.2d 277, 387 N.Y.S.2d
821 (1976), seemingly has aggravated this uncertainty. In Bennett, the natural mother of an
8-year-old girl sought custody from a former schoolmate of the child's grandmother. Id. at
544-45, 356 N.E.2d at 280, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 823. Granting the foster parents a new hearing,
Chief Judge Brietel stated:
[W]here there is warrant to consider displacement of the parent, a determination
that extraordinary circumstances exist is only the beginning, not the end, of judi-
cial inquiry. Extraordinary circumstances alone do not justify depriving a natural
parent of the custody of a child. Instead, once extraordinary circumstances are
found, the court must then make the disposition that is in the best interest of the
child.
Id. at 548, 356 N.E.2d at 283, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 826. It has been commented that the Bennett
decision effectively elevated the "extraordinary circumstances" standard to the status of a
threshold inquiry when the custodian is a foster parent. Carrieri & Murawski, Proposing
Standards for Child Custody: The Proceedings, the Role of the Agency, and the Best Inter-
ests of the Child, 6 FORDHAM Urns. L.J. 185, 203-04 (1978).
:69 55 N.Y.2d 89, 432 N.E.2d 765, 447 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1982).
270 Id. at 95, 432 N.E.2d at 768, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 896.
2 1 Id. at 91-92, 432 N.E.2d at 766, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 894. Joint custody, as distinguished
from divided or split custody, is characterized by "the child resid[ing] most of the year with
one parent, [but] the spouses hav[ing] joint control of its care, upbringing and education,
SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
but the father soon instituted an action to modify the agreement
so as to obtain sole custody of the children.7 2 The lower court,
after finding various facts tending to indicate the mother's unfit-
ness,27 3 concluded that a modification of the original agreement in
the father's favor would be in the best interests of the children.2 4
The Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed the lower
court's order,27 5 despite the dissent's contention that a transfer of
custody is warranted only when there is an extraordinary change in
circumstances.27 6
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, specifically address-
ing the issue raised by the dissenting opinion in the appellate divi-
and equal voice in decisions pertaining to its health, religion, training, vacations, trips, and
the choice of schools . . . ." 1 A. LINDEY, supra note 267, § 14, at 14-60. As one court has
stated, joint custody means giving a "noncustodial" parent equal voice in a child's upbring-
ing. Odette R. v. Douglas R., 91 Misc. 2d 792, 795, 399 N.Y.S.2d 93, 96 (Family Ct. N.Y.
County 1977). Although joint custody is not feasible where parents are antagonistic, it is
viable where parents are "relatively stable [and] amicable... [and are] behaving in mature
civilized fashion." Braiman v. Braiman, 44 N.Y.2d 584, 589-90, 378 N.E.2d 1019, 1021, 407
N.Y.S.2d 449, 451 (1978); see Note, Divorce: The Joint Custody Alternative, 34 OKLA. L.
REV. 119, 120-21 (1981); Comment, Joint Custody: An Alternative for Divorced Parents, 26
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1084, 1107-09 (1979).
272 Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, 55 N.Y.2d 89, 92, 432 N.E.2d 765, 766-67, 447
N.Y.S.2d 893, 894-95 (1982).
273 Id. at 92-93, 432 N.E.2d at 767, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 895. The lower court found that the
mother often left the children alone even though they were afraid to be alone, that she slept
with a male friend to the children's knowledge, and that she and her male friend frequently
violated tenets of the religion in which the children were raised. Id.
274 Id. In addition to examining other factors relevant to an evaluation of a child's best
interests, see note 266 supra, the trial judge noted that the older daughter expressed a
strong desire to live with her father, and that the younger child, while wanting to remain
with her mother, did not wish to be separated from her sister. 55 N.Y.2d at 93, 432 N.E.2d
at 765, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 895.
271 See Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, 81 App. Div. 2d 605, 606, 437 N.Y.S.2d 711, 712
(2d Dep't 1981), aff'd, 55 N.Y.2d 89, 432 N.E.2d 765, 447 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1982). An appellate
court can set aside a custody determination only "where it lacks 'sound and substantial
basis in the testimony' or is 'opposed to everything presented to the court."' In re T, 28
N.Y.2d 391, 395, 271 N.E.2d 215, 217, 322 N.Y.S.2d 231, 233 (1971). Applying this general
standard of appellate review, the appellate division, in Friederwitzer, concluded that "[t]he
evidence adduced at the hearing supports the conclusion of Special Term that the best in-
terests of the children will be served if they are in the custody of the [father] -. " 81
App. Div. 2d at 605, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 712.
276 Id. at 606, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 713 (Weinstein, J., dissenting). Justice Weinstein, relying
upon the Court of Appeals cases of Corradino v. Corradino, 48 N.Y.2d 894, 400 N.E.2d 1338,
424 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1979), and Nehra v. Uhlar, 43 N.Y.2d 242, 372 N.E.2d 4, 401 N.Y.S.2d
168 (1977), initially stated that "[c]ustody of children already residing with one parent pur-
suant to an agreement should not be transferred absent extraordinary circumstances." 81
App. Div. 2d at 606, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 713. Finding no such circumstances in the record,
Justice Weinstein voted to reverse the trial court's transfer of custody. Id.
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sion.2" Recognizing its previous indication that "extraordinary cir-
cumstances" are required for a change of custody,217  the
unanimous Court emphasized that such language should be con-
strued to mean that "countervailing circumstances on considera-
tion of the totality of circumstances" must have arisen subsequent
to the original custody award.279 The Court further stated that al-
though custody may not be changed without considering an earlier
award, there is no single factor that is determinative of the custody
decision.280 Thus, the Court concluded, the best interests of the
child, as determined by an evaluation of all the relevant circum-
stances, is the standard to be used in a change of custody proceed-
ing.281 The Court further noted that this is the applicable rule
whether the initial custodial award "is made after plenary trial or
by adoption of the agreement of the parties. '28 2
While the Friederwitzer Court clarified that the best interests
standard should be applied in a proceeding to change or modify
custody, 283 and that the totality of circumstances must be consid-
ered before a determination is made,284 it is submitted that the
decision may be interpreted as undermining the priority that has
been accorded earlier custodial awards. 85 If the Court's opinion is
277 55 N.Y.2d at 93, 432 N.E.2d at 767, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 895.
278 Id. at 94-95, 432 N.E.2d at 767-68, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 895-96.
2' Id. at 95, 432 N.E.2d at 768, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 896. Initially, the Court noted that
section 240 of the DRL states that, in all cases, neither parent has a prima facie right to
custody. Id. at 93, 432 N.E.2d at 767, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 895; see DRL § 240(1) (McKinney
Supp. 1981-1982). To make the original custody award determinative, the Court reasoned,
would therefore run contrary to the statute, since such a rule would favor the original custo-
dial parent. See 55 N.Y.2d at 95, 432 N.E.2d at 768, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 896. The Court found
additional support for this conclusion in the Court Rules of the Appellate Division, Second
Department, id., which provide that separation agreements are not binding on the court, see
[1982] 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 699.9(f)(4), and that transfers of custody are to be determined by
"circumstances existing at the time application for that purpose is made to it," id. (ap-
proved form J13). Thus, the Court concluded, the "best interests" standard employed by
the trial court and approved by the Appellate Division was "not legally incorrect." 55
N.Y.2d at 96, 432 N.E.2d at 769, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 897.
280 55 N.Y.2d at 93-94, 432 N.E.2d at 767, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 895.
281 Id. at 94, 432 N.E.2d at 767, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 895.
282 Id. at 91, 432 N.E.2d at 767, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 894.
28 See text accompanying note 270 supra.
284 See text accompanying note 281 supra.
'81 See, e.g., Nehra v. Uhlar, 43 N.Y.2d 242, 251, 372 N.E.2d 4, 9, 401 N.Y.S.2d 168, 173
(1977) ("[p]riority, not as an absolute but as a weighty factor, should, in the absence of
extraordinary circumstances, be accorded to the first custody awarded in litigation or by
voluntary agreement."); see also Corradino v. Corradino, 48 N.Y.2d 894, 895, 400 N.E.2d
1338, 1339, 424 N.Y.S.2d 886, 887 (1979); Ross v. Ross, 77 App. Div. 2d 716, 716, 430
N.Y.S.2d 712, 712-13 (3d Dep't 1980); Noel v. Derrick, 71 App. Div. 2d 704, 704, 418
SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
construed in this manner, it apparently eliminates one of the few
objective guidelines within which the subsequent custodial adjudi-
cation may be made.2 6 It is suggested that this increased subjec-
tivity may result in purely de novo determinations of best inter-
ests,287 and thus may result in the continuous transfer of custody
between parents.288 Further, although de novo determinations of
N.Y.S.2d 481, 482-83 (3d Dep't 1979); Austin v. Austin, 65 App. Div. 2d 903, 904, 410
N.Y.S.2d 688, 689 (3d Dep't 1978). See generally A. LINDEY, supra note 267, § 14, at 14-91
to -103. The Friederwitzer Court apparently stressed that the prior custodial award is a
mere factor in the subsequent examination of the child's best interests, see 55 N.Y.2d at 94,
432 N.E.2d at 768, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 896, and that the weight to be assigned such factor is in
the trial judge's discretion, id. at 93-94, 432 N.E.2d at 767, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 895. Since the
court is free to assign little or no weight to the original custodial award, it is possible that a
determination to transfer custody may be totally devoid of any consideration of that factor.
See, e.g., Noel v. Derrick, 71 App. Div. 2d 704, 704, 418 N.Y.S.2d 481, 482-83 (3d Dep't
1979).
21' See Slifkin, Custody and Visitation: The Judge's Viewpoint, 48 N.Y.S.B.J. 450, 454
(1976). Generally, courts have regarded custody determinations as among the most difficult
to render. See, e.g., Thomas J.D. v. Katherine K.D., 79 App. ,Div. 2d 1015, 1017, 435
N.Y.S.2d 338, 339-40 (2d Dep't 1981). Justice Botein once commented that "[a] judge ago-
nizes more about reaching the right result in a contested custody issue than about any other
type of decision he renders." Slifkin, supra, at 450 (quoting B. BoTEIN, TRIAL JUDGE 273
(1952)). Indeed, the painstaking examination of numerous factors in a best interest determi-
nation seems to stem from the expectation that it will not only "protect the child's funda-
mental rights, but will also assist the court in formulating the best solution for the child."
Note, Protecting the Interests of Children in Child Custody Proceedings: A Perspective on
Twenty Years of Theory and Practice in the Appointment of Guardians Ad Litem, 12
CREIGHTON L. REV. 234, 235 (1978). It is not surprising, therefore, that in-depth exploration
of all possible options in custody proceedings has become the norm. See Comment, supra
note 271, at 1084-85. See generally R. WooDY, GETrING CUSTODY WINNING THE LAST BATrLE
OF THE MARITAL WAR ix-xii (1978). Concomitant with this exploration of all options is the •
notion that objective criteria, such as the wishes of the child, see, e.g., Todaro v. Todaro, 76
App. Div. 2d 816, 816, 429 N.Y.S.2d 670, 672 (1st Dep't 1980), are not binding on the court.
287 The best interests standard has been criticized as "incapable of definition," Hen-
szey, Visitation by a Non-Custodial Parent: What is the "Best Interest" Doctrine?, 15 J.
FAM. L. 213, 225 (1976-1977), and, therefore, of little evaluative aid, Comment, Alternatives
to "Parental Right" in Child Custody Disputes Involving Third Parties, 73 YALE L.J. 151,
153-54 (1963). At least one court has suggested that a trial judge will not be "required to
consider anything other than the best interests of the child" if he chooses to disregard an
original custody award. See Noel v. Derrick, 71 App. Div. 2d 704, 704, 418 N.Y.S.2d 481,
482-83 (3d Dep't 1979).
28 See Obey v. Degling, 37 N.Y.2d 768, 770, 337 N.E.2d 601, 602, 375 N.Y.S.2d 91, 93
(1975); Baker v. Baker, 59 App. Div. 2d 519, 520, 397 N.Y.S.2d 11, 12 (2d Dep't 1977).
Referring to child custody awards as "rational choices," Professor Mnookin observed that
"[u]nlike adjudication, rational choice does not require participation of the affected parties,
the use of precedents or rules, or review; today's decision need not be reconciled with similar
decisions made earlier." R. MNoOKIN, CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS
ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW 484 (1978). Accordingly, it would be possible for the mother in
Friederwitzer to petition the court for a modification, and thereby regain custody upon a
showing that there has been a change in circumstances. See Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer,
1982]
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best interests may discourage noncustodial parents from abscond-
ing with their children,28 9 such determinations correspondingly
may increase the number of noncustodial parents who attempt to
obtain legal custody when no circumstantial change has oc-
curred.9 0 It is submitted that if earlier custodial grants are prop-
erly emphasized in later proceedings to change or modify custody,
the probability that adequate consideration will be given to the
stability and continuity of parent-child relationships will be en-
hanced.291 It is hoped, therefore, that courts will regard the
Friederwitzer decision simply as a rejection of the notion that ex-
traordinary circumstances are required for a transfer of custody,
81 App. Div. 2d 605, 606, 437 N.Y.S.2d 711, 711-12 (2d Dep't 1981), a/I'd, 55 N.Y.2d 89, 432
N.E.2d 765, 447 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1982). Furthermore, because the required extent of change in
circumstances is discretionary, it is conceivable that the trial judge in that proceeding could
transfer custody based upon a reluctance to impose religious orthodoxy on the children. See
generally Feldman v. Feldman, 45 App. Div. 2d 320, 321, 358 N.Y.S.2d 507, 509 (2d Dep't
1974) (trial court determination, while "cloaked in the rubric 'best interests of the child'
was, in fact, based upon. . . subjective moral judgment rejecting and in effect severely pun-
ishing this sexually liberated divorced woman for her 'life-style' and personal beliefs"). Al-
though the decision is subject to reversal for abuse of discretion, see In re T, 28 N.Y.2d 391,
395, 271 N.E.2d 215, 217, 322 N.Y.S.2d 231, 233 (1971), such determinations rarely are upset
upon review, Ross v. Ross, 77 App. Div. 2d 716, 716-17, 430 N.Y.S.2d 712, 713 (3d Dep't
1980). Indeed, it has become clear that custody determinations are neither secure nor cer-
tain. See Foster & Freed, Life With Father: 1978, 11 FAM. L.Q. 321, 331 (1978).
29 See People v. Haines, 1 App. Div. 2d 263, 268, 149 N.Y.S.2d 407, 411 (1st Dep't),
aff'd, 1 N.Y.2d 835, 135 N.E.2d 723, 153 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1956). One practice plaguing the law
of custody is the "'seize-run-sue' syndrome," whereby a parent, unsuccessful in custody
proceedings in one jurisdiction, flees with the child to another jurisdiction in an attempt to
obtain a more favorable adjudication. Brosky & Alford, supra note 266, at 695.
290 See generally Brosky & Alford, supra note 266, at 695-98; Ehrenzweig, Interstate
Recognition of Custody Decrees, 51 MicH. L. REV. 345, 352 (1953).
291 See generally J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUND & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD 6-7 (1979) (the lack of finality in custody decisions is "in conflict with the child's
need for continuity"); Foster, Adoption and Child Custody: Best Interests of the Child?, 22
BUFFALO L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1972) ("the best psychological interests of a child require con-
tinuity and consistency in the parent-child relationship"); Note, Lawyering for the Child:
Principles of Representation in Custody and Visitation Disputes Arising From Divorce, 87
YALE L.J. 1126, 1130-31 (1978). Although the prior custodial award is a factor in the subse-
quent adjudication, it should nevertheless be emphasized throughout the modification pro-
ceeding to insure that the stability of the parent-child relationship will not be negated. See
DeFrancesco v. MacNary, 74 App. Div. 2d 966, 967, 425 N.Y.S.2d 885, 886 (3d Dep't 1980);
McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 71 App. Div. 2d 738, 739, 419 N.Y.S.2d 262, 263 (3d Dep't
1979); Corradino v. Corradino, 64 App. Div. 2d 320, 322, 410 N.Y.S.2d 174, 175-76 (3d Dep't
1978), aff'd, 48 N.Y.2d 894, 400 N.E.2d 1338, 424 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1979); Rusin v. Rusin, 103
Misc. 2d 534, 536, 426 N.Y.S.2d 701, 703, (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1980).
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not as a relegation of prior custody to the status of other factors in
the subsequent best interests inquiry.
Thomas R. LaGreca
